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NOTE
The Criminal Trial Process - The Fight for Truth
W HEN THE REvoLuToNARY Galileo left the circle of debating
Scholastics to put their intellectualized hypothesis to test by
actually dropping two objects of a like shape but different weight
from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, a new and startling technique
was established in the methodological search for truth. Although
the Scholars were not particularly receptive to the new empirical
data, the prevailing Aristotelian notion, that the body having the
greater weight would fall faster, was disproved.1 Science, as anyone
knows, has long since adopted the experimental method and even
though "scientists themselves are not always possessed of clear and
sound ideas" of the nature and application of the scientific method,
it has proved to be most useful.' The law has remained consider-
ably more adamant in its Scholastic posture. This is not to say that
the position assumed by the law has been the wrong one - on the
contrary, scientific alternatives have simply not been available. But
a small-scale Copernican Revolution for the law now seems to be
well along the way; and the profession must be prepared to wel-
come changes that promise to elevate human dignity.
The revolution referred to is composed of multifarious develop-
ments in several dissimilar areas of research that permit the devel-
opment of a superior factfinding methodology. The researchers are
psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, behavioral scientists, legal
scholars, and polygraph experts. Much of what they are contribut-
ing to the factfinding process is not adaptable to the present-day
trial, either because the contribution is not fully advanced, or be-
cause the law is not ready for it. The purpose of this Note is to
acquaint the legal profession with some of the research under way,
and explore and anticipate selected problems that will inhibit an
easy transition from the trial of the present to the trial of the fi-
ture.
1C. BRINTON, THE SHAPING OF THE MODERN MIND 93 (Mentor ed. 1959).
"Galen, relying largely on the Bible, taught that man has one more rib than woman.
For hundreds of years physicians accepted that dogma. Then Vesalius had the temer-
ity to dissect the dead bodies of men and women." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 71
(1949).
2 M. COHEN, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AN SCIENcE 48 (1949).
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I. THE CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCESS
A. Fog and Mud3
Our American trial process is a somewhat frightening mystery
to the average layman. Quoting with approval the words of an
eminent jurist, Judge Jerome Frank discussed the problem as fol-
lows:
"If," said Judge Learned Hand to the lawyer, "you lead your client
into the courtroom with you .... you will, if you have the nerve
to watch him, see in his face a baffled sense that there is going
on some kind of game which, while its outcome may be tragic to
him in its development, is incomprehensible." The legal profes-
sion should not take much pride in a system which evokes from
Judge Hand the remark, "About trials hang a suspicion of trickery
and a sense of result depending on cajolery or worse." To Judge
Hand's comments I would add that were it impossible to contrive
a better system, we lawyers could legitimately defend ourselves,
saying, "We do the best we can." But I think such a defense not
legitimate because I think we do not do the best we can ....4
In this Note we propose to examine the present criminal trial proc-
ess to determine how it may be improved.
Recent Supreme Court decisions extending and amplifying the
Bill of Rights via the due process clause seem to be directed toward
ensuring a fair contest between the State and the defendant.' The
equal protection clause has also been used to promote greater equal-
ity in the strength of the combatants.6 Our system of criminal law
is accusatorial rather than inquisitorial7 and an attempt is made to
protect the accused from false, unwarranted accusations.
The Supreme Court has stated that "the basic purpose of a trial
is the determination of truth,"' and has recognized that the protec-
tion of individual liberties frequently interferes with the process of
ascertaining truth in a criminal case.9 It is apparent that the prem-
3 The source of this phrase is a passage from Dickens on the subject of the chan-
cery court: "Never can there come fog too thick, never can there come mud and mire
too deep, to assort with the groping and floundering condition which the High Court
of Chancery, most pestilent of hoary sinners, holds this day in the sight of heaven and
earth." 1 C. DIcKENs, BLEAK HousE 2 (Collier ed. 1964).
4 J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 87.
5 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
6 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
7See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
8 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Short, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
9 Id.; see W. SEAGLE, LAW: THE ScIENcE oF INEFFICIENcy 102 (1952).
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ise underlying the recent constitutional decisions in the area of
criminal law is that the adversary process is the best available
method to arrive at the truth and yet protect the rights of the indi-
vidual."0
B. The Finder of Fact
In recent years there has been considerable modification of the
traditional adversary process for adjucating civil cases. Arbitration
now resolves a large volume of disputes involving labor relations,
contracts, and torts.'" Specialized administrative tribunals have jur-
isdiction over a wide variety of problems.2 Until the recent case
of In re Gault,'" juvenile courts administered justice to juvenile of-
fenders by an inquisitorial process devoid of the formality and con-
stitutional limitations of the criminal trial process.
Perhaps the most significant difference between these methods
of settling disputes and the traditional trial process is the absence
of the jury. The right to trial by jury remains sacred in criminal
trials,' 4 yet it is interesting to note how seldom that right is exer-
cised.'" England, where individual rights are zealously protected,
'OSee Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); cf. Traynor,
Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228 (1964). Sev-
eral of the recent Supreme Court cases have applied constitutional rules traditionally
associated with the criminal adversary process to noncriminal cases. E.g., In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (applied constitutional protections, particularly right to counsel, to
juvenile court hearings); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (applied privilege
against self-incrimination to disbarment proceeding); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964) (applied privilege against self-incrimination to hold that person
granted immunity in a State investigation cannot be incriminated by his testimony in
subsequent federal proceeding). In these cases the Court seemed to recognize the
possibility of criminal or quasi-criminal penalties and protected individual rights de-
spite the noncriminal settings of the cases.
1Automobile insurers have begun to put arbitration clauses in their uninsured
motorist provisions. The probable reason is that companies do not want disputes with
their own customers to be fraught with the delay and the fighting atmosphere of an
adversary trial.
12 One obvious reason is that "Judges cannot furnish the skills in law, accounting,
and engineering supplied by the staff of a relatively simple agency like the FCC, to say
nothing of a more complex agency like the ICC .... " K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV
LAw § 1.05, at 16 (1959). Special skills of the finder of fact are another of the advan-
tages of arbitration.
13 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14J. PRANK, supra note 1, at 109 (1949).
15 One recent study indicates that of the major crime controversies that reach the
stage of formal prosecution and are not dismissed three-fourths are disposed of without
trial, and of those that do go to trial, 60 percent are tried before a jury. Thus, about
one-seventh of all felony prosecutions end in jury trials. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 17-18 (1966).
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has trial by jury only in "major crime" cases.' 6 The jury's sphere
of influence is further reduced by the trend toward removal of cer-
tain types of offenses from the coverage of the criminal law.'
In civil cases, even where juries are used, the tendency has been
to eliminate or weaken most of the exclusionary rules of evidenceis
and to liberalize pretrial discovery in order to prevent surprise at
trial. 9 It seems anomalous that in criminal cases, where a person's
liberty and the protection of society turn on a correct decision of
fact and a proper application of law, these progressive reforms have
not been utilized to any significant extent. The privilege against
self-incrimination usually prevents the jury from hearing the ac-
cused's version of the facts. Cases like Mapp v. Ohio2" and Mir-
anda v. Arizona2' require the exclusion of evidence which, though
possibly quite reliable, was illegally obtained. Finally, it is a nearly
universal rule that pretrial discovery is not permitted in criminal
cases.
22
There is supposed to be explicit faith in the reliability of the
jury,23 but the actions of many lawyers and judges reflect a deep-
seated lack of faith in the mental capacity and rationality of jurors2
Trial lawyers who profess great faith in the jury spend years per-
fecting techniques for manipulating jurors by playing on their prej-
udices, passions, and ignorance. 6 Judges generally say that they
16 J. FRANK, supra note 1 at 109. Several American States limit the right to jury
trial to major crimes. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 15, at 16. For a discus-
sion of the right to jury trial in foreign countries, see id. at 13 n.3.
17 According to one writer, in 1965 71 million of the 195 million people in the
United States were not subject to criminal jurisdiction because they were under 18.
Others such as the mentally ill, alcoholics, addicts, and psychopaths are being treated
as victims of illness rather than as criminals. Kittrie, The Divestment of Criminal
Justice and the Coming of the Therapeutic State, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 43, 43-44
(1967). Kittrie also points out that those incarcerated for treatment under the parens
patriae theory now outnumber imprisoned criminals 4 to 1. Id. at 46.
18 For a brief discussion of the authorities supporting this trend, see K. DAvis,
supra note 12, 5 14.02, at 248-49. Davis attributes the exclusionary rules to the use of
the jury. Id. 5 14.03-.04, at 249-51. The exclusionary rules may account for some
of the acquittals in which the judge disagrees with the jury. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra note 15, at 132-33.
19 See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 100, at 203 (1954).
20 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 2 See notes 31-44 infra & accompanying text.
23 Cf. James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Be-
fore Trial, 47 VA. L. REv. 218, 247-48 (1961).
24 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 816 (1948), and the trial practice manuals cited therein; J. FRANK, supra note
1, at 82-87.
25 See authorities cited note 24 supra.
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agree with nearly all jury verdicts, and yet retain the power to di-
rect verdicts because the jury might make a mistake.2" There is
also considerable reluctance to allow professional faith in the jury
to be tested empirically.2
The case of Griffin v. California28 illustrates the strength of
the unspoken belief that juries behave emotionally and irrationally
and are not sufficiently intelligent and objective to correctly apply
legal rules.29 The Griffin decision forbids the prosecution from
pointing out to the jury that the accused did not take the stand in
his own defense, and at least tacitly advances the policy that it is
better to keep the jurors ignorant and hope they will not notice the
failure of the defendant to testify. This puts the supporters of the
jury system in the strange position of relying on the jury's ignor-
ance.
Consistency would require those who profess faith in the jury's
ability to understand and apply the law to support the proposition
that the defendant should have the right to an instruction on the
meaning of the privilege and a judicial warning that no inference
of guilt may be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify. This
seems to be the position taken by the Supreme Court.3"
26 See J. FRANIK, supra note 1, at 180.
7 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 15, at vi-vii. The authors" research into
jury behavior included the tape recording of actual jury deliberations, with the consent
of the judge and counsel, but without the jurors' consent or knowledge. The project
led to public censure by federal authorities and to the enactment of statutes against jury-
tapping in 30 States.
28380 U.S. 609 (1965).
29 It should be noted that the rule in Griffin represents an attempt by the Court to
make meaningful the constitutional right to refuse to testify and that the Griffin
case cannot be read to indicate that, where no such constitutional right is involved, the
Court lacks faith in the integrity and ability of the jury in the application of the law.
This point is discussed by the Court in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). The
Court distinguished that case, in which the defendant contended that the "fairness" of
the trial was impaired because of the admission of evidence of his prior crimes, from
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), which involved the protection of a specific
constitutional right, the right to exclude involuntary confessions. 385 U.S. at 564-66.
SO In Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1936), the Court held that
since there was a federal statute which provided that a defendant in a criminal case
was a competent witness in his own defense and specifically stated that no presumption
against him could be raised by his failure to testify, the defendant had a right to a
charge explaining to the jury that his failure to testify should not raise any presumption
against him in their deliberations. It is arguable that Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965), elevated this "no presumption" rule to constitutional status. It would
seem that if a defendant has the right to the cautionary instruction where the right is
statutory, a fortiori he must have the right when the "no presumption" rule is consti-
tutional. But see State v. Senzarino, 224 N.E.2d 389, 396-98 (Ohio C.P. 1967),
where an Ohio trial court overlooked this argument and denied the right to such an
instruction by distinguishing Bruno on the ground that in that case there was a statu-
19681
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The legal realists should be content with a rule which would
allow the defendant's attorney, by drawing upon his experience or
upon empirical studies, the opportunity to choose whether the cau-
tionary instruction should be given. It is submitted that this rule
would be consistent with the idea that the trial is, or should be, a
truth-determining process, and also would serve to make the Grif-
fin principle meaningful.
C. Pretrial Discovery or Surprise?
The unavailability of discovery in criminal cases reflects and
promotes the "fight theory" of trial. As Judge Frank put it:
"[M]any prosecutors, infected badly by the fighting spirit, in par-
tisan manner produce only the evidence they think will cause con-
victions.""1  Suppression by the prosecutor of material evidence
favorable to the defendant is violative of due process.3 2  This rule
apparently does not require the prosecutor to disclose such evidence
before trial, however.33 The suppression strategy may assist the
prosecutor bent on winning the game but obviously cripples the
factfinding process.
Those who resist the liberalization of criminal discovery proce-
dures argue that allowing discovery by the defendant would tip the
balance of the scales too far toward the defendant,34 encourage per-
jury and intimidation of witnesses," and allow the defendant to dis-
cover the prosecution's case while at the same time permitting him
tory right to be free from the presumption, while in Senzarino there was no such
State statute.
It may be doubtful which course of action, to request the charge or to remain silent
on the issue, would best serve to prevent prejudice caused by the defendant's failure to
testify. Cf. J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICr 99 (1966), which
discusses an empirical study which indicated that in tort cases insurance counsel would
be well advised to avoid objecting and requesting a cautionary instruction when the
matter of insurance was injected into the trial. Apparently it was better not to call
attention to the matter.
31 J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 99; see Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J.
1017, 1021 (1965).
32 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 73, 86-87 (1963).
33 See Traynor, supra note 10, at 242-43. The California Supreme Court, before
the Supreme Court decided Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 73 (1963), had held that due
process did not require pretrial discovery. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372
P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962). The Brady case seemingly did not change this
rule.
34 E.g., Traynor, supra note 10, at 249.
35 E.g., id. at 228-29; Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53
A.B.A.J. 732, 734 (1967). Justice Botein argues that discovery actually prepares the
trial lawyer to discover and defend against such fraud. B. BOTBIN, TRIAL JUDGE 107
(1952).
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to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination to protect himself
from discovery.36 None of these arguments is supported by the
experience of Vermont, a State which has had liberal discovery for
several years."
As a practical matter, the prosecution needs discovery much
less than the defense. The prosecution nearly always enjoys a con-
siderable advantage over the defense in resources and manpower
and nearly always has the investigation well under way before the
defendant has had a chance to even group his forces. 8 It would
seem that the privilege against self-incrimination would limit the
extent of discovery but probably not prohibit it altogether.39
At present there is little discovery except for cases in which a
prosecutor elects to open his files because his case is so strong that
the probability of a guilty plea is high.4° This has the effect of
clearing up factual mysteries in the cases where such clarification
is least needed, and leaving the close cases which most often go to
jury trial4 ' to be decided by dramatic surprise evidence4
Justice Traynor forcefully stated the need for discovery:
3 3Traynor, supra note 10, at 228. In Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372
P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962), the court held that the privilege limited discovery
by the prosecution to the identity of witnesses and the existence of any reports which,
the defendant intends to use at trial.
3 7 Langrock, supra note 35, at 734.
3 8 fBrennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
WAsH. U.L.Q. 279, 292-93; Traynor, supra note 10, at 229. Mr. Justice Brennan has
pointed out that most criminal defendants are indigent and that assigned counsel need
discovery so that they, as well as the State, can benefit from the investigative work done
while the trail was fresh. Brennan, supra at 285-87.
3 0 Mr. Justice Brennan has argued that the privilege does not in fact bar the prose-
cution from discovery of the defendant because of the State's advantages in investigative
resources. Brennan, supra note 38, at 292-93. The State, in effect, benefits from in-
formal discovery before the case is under the control of the court. The opportunity of
the prosecution to discover facts about the accused by interrogation has been greatly
reduced since Mr. Justice Brennan's article. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). A California case has already
upheld limited pretrial discovery by the prosecution. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.
2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
40 This type of discovery preceded Vermont's adoption of a discovery statute. Lang-
rock, supra note 35, at 732-34. The voluntary process is basically the procedure em-
ployed in the federal system. Traynor, supra note 10, at 237. Justice Traynor objects
to the voluntary procedure because "pretrial discovery can operate effectively only if it
is impartially administered in accord with objective standards free of adversary consid-
erations of trial strategy." Id. at 237-38.
411H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 15, at 31. The number of jury trials de-
pends on several factors, but the basic factor seems to be the closeness of the case, or,
stated another way, the unpredictability of the jury's decision.
4 2 Much of the suspense and drama of a trial is missing where there is no jury. L.
GREEN, JUDGE AN JURY 403-04 (1930).
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Discovery is a bad word to devotees of the old-time theater of
hide-and-go-seek. It is time to ask whether the element of sur-
prise they set such store by is not one of the most overrated ele-
ments in the judicial process. It is one thing to acknowledge its
usefulness in testing credibility, but quite another to glorify it as
the keystone of the adversary system. If it were indeed the key-
stone, the arch would in truth be fallen. The truth is most likely
to emerge when each side seeks to take the other by reason rather
than by surprise.43
If the goal of the trial process is really the truth, it is time for the
extensive liberalization of discovery procedures. The trend is in
the right direction.
4
D. The Facts Found by the Jury
According to Justice Botein, "No judge or any other critic
knows what facts a jury finds from the evidence."4 5  This is odd
because in theory the jury finds the facts and then applies the law
as given to them by the judge." If that theory were actually prac-
ticed, the jury would have to submit answers to specific factual
issues.47
The general verdict is the standard in criminal cases, however,
and the special verdict is disfavored.48 The general verdict en-
hances the probability that jurors will respond to appeals to their
43 Traynor, supra note 10, at 249.
44 Ohio law now provides that either the prosecution or the defense may apply to
the court for permission to take a deposition from any witness. OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.50 (Page Supp. 1966). For a discussion, see Comment, The New Crim-
inal Deposition Statute in Ohio - Help or Hindrance to Justice?, 19 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 279 (1968). Vermont limits discovery to the defendant but, unlike Ohio,
allows the defendant to get a court order compelling the prosecution to allow him
to inspect and copy documents, statements, and other evidence taken from him, as
well as allowing him to take depositions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 5§ 6721-27
(Supp. 1967). California is probably the leader in the area of expanding discovery.
That State now allows the defendant to discover most of the products of the prosecu-
tor's investigation, including names and addresses of witnesses, and also permits limited
discovery by the prosecution. California's development has been largely by judicial
decision. See Traynor, supra note 10, at 243-49 and the cases cited therein. For a
discussion of the English discovery practice, see Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 749 (1964).
45 B. BOTEIN, supra note 35, at 107.
46 J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170 (1930).
47 Id.
488 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 31.0213] (2d ed. 1953). Special verdicts
are used where it is necessary to separate decisions on two issues. United States v.
Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (special finding required to determine cor-
rect penalty in case of guilt). Reluctance to use the procedure may be explained by
the fact that it is technically difficult to apply. Id. at 278.
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passions and prejudices. 9 Despite this likelihood, it is argued that
the jury mitigates the severity of the law and that forcing the jury
to adhere to its theoretical function would require the application
of many bad rules of law and would result in less equitable deci-
sions."0 The jury is thus considered to be a necessary and conven-
ient means of legal reform. Professor James, for example, feels
that the general verdict is to be preferred to the special verdict
wherever the law is changing or out of tune with "popular notions
of justice."" He would presumably favor general verdicts in crim-
inal cases.
Although recent research on the behavior of juries does indi-
cate that juries are usually more lenient than judges,52 it seems quite
probable that in many cases juries do convict where judges would
have acquitted,53 and that in many of these cases, jurors would not
have agreed to the necessary findings of fact had special interroga-
tories been submitted to them. Thus, it is not necessarily true that
the general verdict operates in favor of the defendant. 4
It is submitted that until there is considerable reform in the
criminal law, especially the abolition of capital punishment, the
jury will probably be necessary as a means of injecting equity into
the criminal trial process. Much detailed research into the me-
chanics of jury decisionmaking is urgently needed; accordingly, the
legal profession and the legislatures should welcome and encourage
such research rather than resisting and restricting it as has been
done in the past."5 If the empirical studies do indicate that jury per-
formance is inadequate, the special verdict could be a good com-
promise.
E. The Bifurcated Trial
Where constitutional rights are involved, the Supreme Court
has not shown complete faith in the jury's ability to decide cases
involving complex issues.5" In Jackson v. Denno,57 the Court re-
49 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 816 (1948).
50 See James, supra note 23, at 247-48.
51 Id. at 248.
5 2 H. KALVBN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 15, at 68.
3 .
54 Id.
5 5 See generally note 27 supra.
5 (See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
57378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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quired that a trial judge decide that a confession was voluntary be-
fore submitting the confession and the issue of its voluntariness to
the jury. 8 The Court feared that the jury might have considered
the truth or falsity of the confession in determining the issue of
voluntariness.59 Naturally the general verdict did not reveal how
the jury had treated the confession, and therefore the Court re-
versed the conviction and remanded the case to the State court for
an independent factual determination of the voluntariness issue.6"
The case illustrates a possible means of reducing the number of
collateral issues which a jury must consider, and of thereby prevent-
ing confusion of those issues with the central issues of the case.
A bifurcation of trial might be desirable in the case of an in-
sanity plea. The issue of mental competence at the time of trial is
usually tried separately6 but the issue of sanity at the time of the
purported crime is usually tried contemporaneously with the guilt
issue because such insanity excuses one from criminal responsibil-
ity." It would seem that there should be a factual determination
by the jury that the defendant did or did not commit the act com-
plained of and that the issue of insanity should be considered sepa-
rately.6"
II. DISFUNCTIONAL RULES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
A. "On Hard and Soft Centres"64
Theories of the relationship of the Bill of Rights to the due
process clause of the 14th amendment vary considerably in empha-
sis and approach. Some of the justices have stressed the need for
fixed rules to make the law certain and predictable while others,
emphasizing the need for experiment, have preferred individualized
58Id. at 395.
5 9 See id. at 376-77.
60 Jackson, of course, leaves open the possibility that the judge will find a confes-
sion voluntary and submit it to the jury and that they will then find it involuntary and
refuse to consider it on the issue of guilt, although they will have difficulty resisting its
influence. This seems to be another area where it is thought better to err on the side
of leniency rather than to risk convicting an innocent person. The individual in reality
is protected from prejudice by the confession only if the evidence of involuntariness
is sufficient to convince the judge to refuse to submit the confession to the jury.
6 1 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1368 (West 1956); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.37 (Page 1954).
62 For a discussion of this problem see text accompanying notes 196-224 infra.
63 See text accompanying notes 208-14 infra.
64 A. COMpORT, DARWIN AND THE NAKED LADY (1962).
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justice. The interpretation currently favored has characteristics
that could be disfunctional if carried too far. The Constitution
may be construed to prohibit experiments necessary to determine
whether there is an alternative to the adversary trial. The fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be used for
illustration. In Twining v. New Jersey,65 the Supreme Court re-
jected the contention that a trial could not be "fair" if the privilege
against self-incrimination were not afforded.
Even if the historical meaning of due process of law and decisions
of this court did not exclude the privilege from it, it would be
going far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is
the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free government.66
The privilege was not thought to be "of the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty," 7 and to do without it would not "violate those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions."' This "fundamental
fairness" doctrine was eventually supplanted 'by the "incorporation
doctrine."6" The complete incorporation theorists deem "funda-
mental" those rights enumerated in the first eight amendments to
the Constitution. The process of absorbtion carries the enumerated
right over to the state proceedings unattenuated in form or sub-
stance." Although the incorporation doctrine has only been ap-
plied selectively,7 the Twining case has been overruled by Malloy
v. Hogan72 and the privilege against sef-incrimination is now ap-
plied to the States. The requirement that the fundamental right be
applied congruently in State and federal courts seriously inhibits
65 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
661d. at 113.
67 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
681d. at 328.
69 With the Mapp decision, the incorporation doctrine visibly became a substitute.
Arguments for incorporation theory had long been made, futilely, in dissenting opin-
ions. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 131, 150, 151 (1961) (dissenting opinions
by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan respectively); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68, 123 (1947) (dissenting opinions by Justices Black and Murphy respectively);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (dissenting opinion by Justice Har-
Ian); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (dissenting opinion by Justice
Harlan). See also Note, The Adamson Case: A Study in Constitutional Technique, 58
YALE L.J. 268 (1949).
70 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
71 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (sixth amendment right to counsel).
See generally, Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L REV. 746 (1965).
72 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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experimentation necessary to determine whether an alternative to
the adversary process would render results more cognizant of basic
notions of fairness, justice, and individual liberty. For example, the
manner in which the Court has delineated the fifth amendment
privilege leaves little, if any, room for polygraph experiment. Ob-
viously to subject the accused to a lie detector test would violate
the amendment as it is presently construed.7 Even requiring wit-
nesses or jurors to submit to lie detector tests or psychological
fitness tests would present problems of constitutional dimension."
Still more apparent is the uncompromising attitude the Court can
be expected to take toward narcoanalysis which not only neutral-
izes the conscious free will but also penetrates the subconscious. 5
The penumbral rights theory contributes significantly to the for-
tress of legal protection surrounding the accused. 6 The "zone of
privacy" emanating from the penumbra of the first, third, fifth, and
ninth amendments secures those specific guarantees against intru-
sion.77 The effect of the penumbral rights doctrine is to lessen the
opportunity to experiment in criminal trials.
73 Because a lie detector test measures physiological responses to questions, and not
the answers themselves, one route to admissibility may be open. In Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court upheld the admission of a blood test taken
from an accused while in custody and over his objection. The Court distinguished be-
tween "testimonial" and "physical" evidence in disposing of the fifth amendment claim.
See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood samples); cf. Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954) (wiretap). Since the oral response in a polygraph examination
is usually controlled (the subject is required to answer every question in the negative),
it is clear from a physiological viewpoint that the evidence is physical. The argument
that but for the compulsion to answer, even though in the negative, no evidence would
be elicited, is a tenuous one. The controlled response functionally serves to eliminate
a variable that could otherwise distort the recorded data. The subject's participation
in self-accusation is, practically, no more significant than the participation attributed
to him in the blood sample cases because his blood flows. Beyond the fact that differ-
ent anatomical machinations produce the controlled effect, there is no legally signifi-
cant physiological distinction. The only meaningful difference from a legal stand-
point is that the stimulus that evokes the controlled response in the lie detector case
comes from without - the examiner's instruction - and inhibits a present exercise of
free will, while in the blood test case (even assuming that the stimulus comes from
without) the infringement of free will has never been at issue - blood flows (assuming
life, and the desire to live) regardless of free will. If a polygraph examination were
mandatory for every accused, it is likely that the combination of oral response (even
though not measured) and the presence of nonvolitional aspects would lead the Court
to find a fifth amendment violation.
74 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. People v. DeLucia, 282
N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
75 "It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession would be less the
product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having
the effect of a 'truth serum.' " Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963).
76 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77 Id.
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Further consideration of the present trends in constitutional in-
terpretation does reveal some open paths to experiment short of
constitutional amendment. The incorporation doctrine is not en-
tirely homogeneous. Specifically, although Mr. Justice Black, a
complete incorporationist, maintains that the first eight amend-
ments are the final and complete expression of what is fundamen-
tal,7 Mr. Justice Douglas does not agree.7" Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justice Brennan joined in the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut,0 where Mr. Justice
Goldberg expressed the view that the ninth amendment is mani-
fest recognition that certain "fundamental rights exist that are not
expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments . . . .18 Of
course, the whole Court has never been in agreement that the in-
corporation doctrine is proper at all." How receptive to a new
truth-seeking process the Supreme Court would be if, for instance,
a lie detector were used, is not perfectly clear. The Court ought
not to prevent this meritorious progress by maintaining the present
level of esteem for the privilege against self-incrimination unless
there is some justification for the privilege other than mere
fidelity to the incorporation principle. This argument would be
more persuasive if it could 'be shown that a new trial process could
be based upon a higher degree of respect for human dignity than
the present trial process. It would then be conceivable that the
Court would hold that the privilege against self-incrimination is
only applicable to adversary proceedings, and that inquiries that do
not "violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"' 83
are constitutional.
B. The Rule That "It is Hard for a Man to be Bound
to Criminate Himself"84
The question whether the fifth amendment privilege must have
constitutional magnitude merits consideration. The privilege
against self-incrimination has a "mystical and emotional atmos-
7 8 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion). But
cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
79 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
81Id. at 492.
8 2 See Frankfurter, supra note 71.
8 3 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
4 ExTRAcTs FROM BENTHAM 304 (1844).
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phere" that the late Professor McCormick attributed in part to
its origin in the medieval church.85 But the common popularity
of the privilege today is probably due, in large part, to the loyalty
oath cases,86 and the House Committee on Un-American Activities
hearings87 after the Second World War. Without a doubt, it is a
rule of noble history and deserves veneration." A place in the
common law of England was made for the privilege in the famous
trial of John Lilburn.89 Lilburn was charged in Star Chamber
with sedition, and, although he was "whipped and pilloried" for
his refusal to take an oath and answer questions on matters not di-
rected to the charge against him, he later succeeded in having the
conviction set aside and in establishing the rule against self-incrim-
ination.9"
Most of the States were early in adopting constitutional pro-
tection against self-incrimination, because the English and pre-Rev-
olution experience was fresh in mind.9 Yet, surprisingly perhaps,
the fifth amendment was not incorporated into the due process
clause of the 14th amendment until the 1964 case of Malloy v.
Hogan.2  The attitude of the Supreme Court, prior to the Malloy
decision, was best expressed by Justice Cardozo:
What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also, as the cases
show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination ....
85 C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 120, at 252 (1954).
86E.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See also Byse, Teachers and the Fifth Amend-
muent, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (1954); Horowitz, Loyalty Tests for Employment in the
Motion Picture Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV. 438 (1954).
87 See Fortas, Methods of Committees Investigating Subversion - A Critique, 29
NoTRE DAME LAw. 192 (1954); Newman, The Supreme Court, Congressional Inves-
tigations, and Influence Peddling, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 796 (1958); Nutting, Freedom of
Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs,
47 MICH. L. REV. 181 (1948).
88 For a discussion of the history of the rule, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250
(McNaughton rev. 1966) and authorities cited therein.
89 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 85, at 254.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 256.
92 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Significantly, even as late as 1961, the Supreme Court had
held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not a fundamental right. Cohen
v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). The first amendment freedoms, in contrast to the
privilege, had all been carried over to the States before the incorporation doctrine was
accepted by a majority of the Court. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(separation of church and state); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1949) (free-
dom of religion); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech).
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This too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today
as in the past there are students of our penal system who look
upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who
would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether. No doubt there
would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical
or mental .... Justice, however, would not perish if the accused
were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.9 3
The change in judicial attitude since Malloy is best exhibited by
Justice Goldberg's statement of the policies of the privilege:
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an impor-
tant advance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."' It re-
flects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference
for an accusatorial . . . system of criminal justice; our fear that
self-incrimination statements will be elicited by inhumane treat-
ment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the ... government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load"; our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and... our realization
that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is
often "a protection to the innocent."94
Happily, the late Professor Wigmore's great work treats each of
the policy considerations stated in the Court's opinion. 5  Note-
worthy is Professor Wigmore's comment, after reviewing the ra-
tionale and policies behind the rule, that the privilege is used for
many reasons, few of which can be related to any legitimate pur-
pose.
96
Some of the justifications for the rule announced in Justice
Goldberg's opinion can be treated without difficulty. The asser-
tion that the privilege hallmarks an "important advance in the de-
velopment of our liberty" and a ':landmark" in man's purposeful
drive toward self-civilization does not state a reason for the rule. 7
It merely tells about the significance of the rule. The statement
describing the nature of the legal system is similarly irrelevant.
98
The "cruel trilemma" of the disclosure of harmful facts, contempt,
or perjury exists in every situation where there is compulsory testi-
93 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
94 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
05 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, at 310-18.
96Id. at 318.
97 Id. at 312. This justification was first advanced in . GRIsWoLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (paralleling the disuse of torture).
98 J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, at 312.
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mony regardless of whether the witness is the defendant in a crim-
inal trial.99 Of course, the trilemma appears to be most "cruel" in
a criminal trial in which the accused must testify."'
Fear of "inhumane treatment and abuses" is certainly a legiti-
mate concern. Dean Wigmore divided the subject into two cate-
gories: torture and "browbeating or bullying," the latter of which
he conceded may provide "a partial justification" for the privilege
against self-incrimination, at least when the obnoxious treatment
takes place before a grand jury, legislative committee, or a magis-
trate, where the examiner has wide latitude to ask questions which
strain the requirement of relevance. 1 Although Dean Wigmore
dismissed torture as outdated, cases involving physical torture have
occurred too recently in the past to warrant such an assumption.
12
Further, browbeating and bullying, if not torture in fact, may ap-
proach it.'0 The modern trial, however, is an adequate means to
protect against such abuses. Pretrial custody cases where judicial
supervision is lacking are the real bases for the Court's fear.'
The reason for the requirement that the government carry the
entire burden "in its contest with the individual" is based primarily
on the concepts of sportsmanship and fair play.0 5 It is implicitly
assumed that the criminal defendant is somewhat analogous to the
fox in a fox hunt. 6 The privilege against self-incrimination com-
pensates for the superior forces of the prosecution and tends to
99Id. at 316.
100 Id. Is there ever such a "cruel trilemma"? The alternative of disclosure pre-
sents an anomaly. Voluntary disclosure is supposed to bring relief from the anxiety of
guilt feelings; yet compelled disclosure is thought to be "cruel." Id. Assuming that
the accused suffers anxiety that would be relieved through disclosure (whether volun-
tary or not), the "cruel" characterization would only apply to the fact that a human
being would be required to act in contravention of the instinct of self-preservation.
But society does not fret over subjecting an accused to the jeopardy of trial or sentence
even though an absolute bar on prosecutions or conviction would be, in this context,
decidedly more humane and less difficult for the accused. The vexing nature of dis-
closure could be alleviated more practically by reducing the hazards to self-preservation
- such as legislating humane penal and punishment reform. It does appear that to
term the trilemma "cruel" is something of an overstatement. The other alternatives in
the trilemma, perjury and contempt, assume, respectively, a devout witness in every
case. These assumptions are not altogether probable. Id.
101 Id. at 315-16.
102 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
103 See, e.g., Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
104 See cases cited note 103 supra.
105 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, at 317.
106 EXTRACTS FROM BENTHAM, supra note 84, at 310.
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equalize the parties to the contest; the criminal defendant, just as the
fox, must have a fair chance to escape. The modern trial, however,
is not, and should not be a game, and sportsmanship is a poor justifi-
cation for the rule. It is arguable that today the privilege has been
so far extended that it overcompensates for the inequality of the
parties and in so doing, prevents the determination of the truth and
thus undermines the very purpose of a trial.
Professor McCormick's indictment of the privilege has consid-
erable merit:
The privilege is an institution which is built on sentimental
association, rather than on its value in protecting substantial hu-
man interests ....
The privilege operates principally in aid of the guilty: the in-
nocent have no need of it .... 107
It runs counter to common-sense practices of investigation in
the ordinary affairs of life.... TThe felt need for access to this
primary source of information ... places a strain upon the courts
in administering the privilege.',0
Similarly, Justice Cardozo's observation, that "[j]ustice ... would
not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to or-
derly inquiry,"'0 9 appears to be quite sound."'
Because the privilege contributes little if anything to the effort
to find truth,"' it must ameliorate some deficiency in the trial proc-
ess if it is -to earn its way. No attempt is made here to deny the
importance of immunity from self-incrimination during pretrial
stages. Procedural safeguards perform invaluable functions in min-
imizing the chance that an innocent person will be subjected to an
unfounded accusation of crime. It is the pretrial period - arrest
to trial - that is most "critical" in regard to the preservation of
human dignity. But at trial, in open court, it is difficult to find
any compelling reason to tolerate the multiple burdens caused by
the exercise of the privilege.
107 But see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, at 310 (protects the accused who would
perform badly as a witness).
108 C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 85, at 290.
109 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
11OTraynor, Devils of Due Process, 23 U. Cm. L. REv, 657, 679 (1966).
"' The argument that the privilege protects the innocent but nervous defendant
(see note 107 supra) has been challenged. Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CuH. L. REv. 687, 690 (1951).
Perhaps a statement from the trial judge, after evaluating the accused's condition, in-
forming the jury that the defendant's anxiety on the stand appears to him to be the
product of a natural inclination and not the trauma of evasion and lying, would, in
light of the jury's recognition of the judge's experience in seeing many witnesses, pro-
tect the accused from harmful inferences.
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C. The McNabb-Mallory Rule - A Wider Gulf Between
the Search and the Truth?
Prior to the decisions in Miranda v. Arizona"2 and Escobedo v.
Illinois,"' the Supreme Court established rules applicable in fed-
eral courts regarding unlawful detention. In McNabb v. United
States," 4 the Court held that confessions secured by police during
a period of detention and interrogation prior to arraignment could
not be admitted into evidence at trial under the circumstances of
the case. It appeared that at least two of the McNabb brothers
were detained for more than 2 days. The purpose of the police
detention was to interrogate the McNabb brothers, operators of an
illegal still, about the murder of a federal agent who was investi-
gating the family's activities. While there was some evidence of
coercive practices by the police," 5 the Court did not reach the ques-
tion of a violation of the due process clause of the 14th amend-
ment." 6 Rather, the Court rested its decision on "the duty of estab-
lishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evi-
dence.""' 7  Thus, the exclusionary rule regarding confessions and
inculpatory statements made during a period of unnecessary delay
in presenting the accused before a magistrate for arraignment is
not of constitutional origin, but is a rule derived from the Supreme
Court's supervisory power over the federal court system" 8 and is
therefore not applicable to State court proceedings through the 14th
amendment. The McNabb decision was aimed at curbing the co-
ercive police practice of subjecting the accused to interrogation and
incommunicado detention before first obtaining the sanction of an
impartial magistrate." 9
In Mallory v. United States,' the Court made it clear that "un-
necessary delay" in arraignment is alone enough to nullify a con-
fession obtained during the period of such delay.' 2 ' Significantly,
112 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
113 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
114 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
115 Id. at 344-45.
116 Id. at 340. But see United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 67 (1944) (refer-
ence to psychological coercive features of McNabb as "decisive").
117 318 U.S. at 340.
1 1 8 See 8 J. Mooit , FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 5.02 (2d ed. 1966).
119 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) (eight-day delay before arraign-
ment did not vitiate confession obtained within brief period after arrest).
120 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
121 Accord, Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
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there was no evidence of coercive practices in Mallory and the con-
fession was not one which traditionally would be thought of as
coerced.1
22
It is quite apparent that the federal exclusionary rule was in-
tended to protect a suspect from coercion by curbing police prac-
tices geared toward the procurement of confessions. The warn-
ings now required to be given by Miranda appear adequate to per-
form the same function. While Miranda is directed at the same
goals and motivated by the same notions of fairness, 2 1 it is based on
the privilege against self-incrimination and is, therefore, a consti-
tutional requirement."
As a practical matter, the Miranda warnings severely limit the
scope of the investigation that may be brought to bear upon the
accused. They do not, however, impose a limitation upon the per-
missible length of detention, and do not inhibit investigation which
does not involve interrogation of the accused. 2  While Miranda
can be expected to reduce the period of detention in practice, it does
not impose a limitation as a matter of law.'
The significance of .the Miranda decision is greater than simply
its extension of the fifth amendment privilege to an earlier stage
of the accusatorial process - thereby giving effect to the privilege
"at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help."''I T Mir-
anda also insists that a confession be disregarded if warnings were
not given, regardless of -the reliability of the confession or its pro-
bative value. In other words, it makes no difference that the con-
fession was given voluntarily in fact and represents a truthful
account of events that transpired.2 8
The emergence of a new constitutional basis for exclusion be-
came apparent with Mapp v. Ohio.20 In Mapp, the Supreme Court
122 But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (incommunicado detention
may be inherently coercive).
123 Id. at 463.
124 It would be superfluous, in light of all that has been written about Miranda, to
give that case extensive treatment here. It is sufficient to note that although the priv-
ilege was once thought to vest only after arraignment, Miranda holds that it vests at
the moment the suspect is in custody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." Id. at 444. The Court has simply reevaluated the events in
the arrest-to-trial process and has determined that the adversary character of earlier steps
requires protection. Id. at 469.
125 Id. at 477-78.
126d. at 463 n.32.
127 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring),
quoted in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1964).128 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
129 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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overruled Wolf v. Colorado.' Wolf had held that the rule of
Weeks v. United States"3 ' - which required the suppression of evi-
dence obtained through an illegal search and seizure - was based
on federal supervisory power, not on the Constitution.'32 At the
time that Wolf was decided, the prevailing fundamental fairness
test provided a basis for exclusionary rules to combat only those
practices of the police which undermined the truth-determining
process. 3 Thus, when Wolf was decided, rules of exclusion were
viewed as essentially evidentiary rules founded on libertarian prin-
ciples with no constitutional attachment. Exclusion was not based
on offensive police practices alone unless they were "shocking.
'1 34
In Mapp, however, the Court held that the unreasonable seizure of
lewd and lascivious books and pictures violated the fourth amend-
ment, that the fourth amendment was incorporated into the 14th
amendment, and that the matter seized could not be introduced as
evidence despite its probative value and reliability.'38 The unrea-
sonable search - an offensive police practice held to be prohibited
by the Constitution - was alone the basis for the rule of exclu-
sion.13
6
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Mapp, observed that McNabb
violations by State police had not moved the Court to exclude evi-
dence, even though it was unlawfully obtained." 7 It will be re-
called that Mapp was the first decision of the Supreme Court to en-
force a rule of exclusion even though the evidence had probative
value and was not coerced. It would now seem inconsistent, in
light of Mapp, for the Court to adhere to their holdings in McNabb
and Mallory in a situation involving a McNabb violation by State
police officers. In light of the Court's explicit statement in Miranda
of the continuing vitality of the McNabb-Mallory rule, 3' it is con-
ceivable that the Court will apply the McNabb-Mallory rule to the
130 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
131232 U.S. 383 (1914).
132 See text accompanying note 118 supra.
133 338 U.S. 25 (1949); cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (overruled
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
134 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
135 Actually, the seed of Mapp was sown in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961) where the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that the truth-
fulness or reliability of a confession is not an element to be considered in determining
voluntariness. Id. at 541.
136 367 U.S. at 657; accord, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
137 367 U.S. at 683-84.
138 384 U.S. at 463 n.32.
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States. Yet, since Miranda already affords considerable protection
for the accused who makes statements while in custody, the only
conceivable function of the McNabb-Mallory rule would be to pro-
hibit the admission of any statements made by the accused even
though given voluntarily and even though the accused effectively
waived his constitutional rights.89
An application of the McNabb-Mallory rule to the States would
not be as analytically sound as it may appear. It would 'be valid
only if given the underlying premise of the fight theory of criminal
adjudication which frankly recognizes the awe-provoking power of
the State and the need -to give -the defendant a sporting chance in
the ensuing battle. But further analysis reveals that there is a sig-
nificant difference between the rule in Mapp which excludes evi-
dence obtained because of the constitutional violation and the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule which excludes evidence in the absence of a re-
lationship between the prohibited act and the inculpatory evidence.
To the extent that the McNabb-Mallory rule is addressed to a fear
of police coercion, it is properly a rule of constitutional dimension;
but Miranda has already been read to perform that function.140
To give the McNabb-Mallory rule constitutional force would be to
admit with finality that the adversary process is not a method for
seeking truth, but is a means of equalizing combatants to ensure a
good fight.
141
Thus, the McNabb-Mallory rule has been undermined by Mir-
anda. Its applicability in the federal courts under the supervisory
power is no longer justifiable. The only possible rationale for the
rule of exclusion is that it will curb unwarranted delays in taking
the accused before a magistrate. In light of the availability of civil
and criminal remedies to effect compliance with the "without un-
reasonable delay" requirement, it is obvious that to use an exclu-
sionary rule instead would be disfunctional. Society in general
suffers as the crime rate climbs; the courts will face more delay be-
cause every defendant will be advised to move for suppression of
the unrelated evidence if there is any chance of success; the prose-
339 Of course a McNabb-Mallory violation may be construed as an invasion of pri-
vacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). However, it is difficult to
see the rationale for imposing an exclusionary rule on this basis.
140 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966).
14 1 See 8 J. WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE § 2252, at 318 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Some
commentators nevertheless urge a 14th amendment absorption of the fcNabb-Mallory
rule. See, e.g., Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith & Hope, 42
NEB. L. REV. 483, 567 (1963); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right
to Counsel and Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24, 34-39 (1960).
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cution will be faced with the frustrating task of representing the
public under laws made without regard to the interests of the pub-
lic; and everyone prepared for trial will experience the anxiety of
waiting for someone to sweep away the mud and the fog, clear the
issues, clear the courtroom, and make way for others to play the
game.
D. Spillover and Constitutional Diseconomies
Because the Supreme Court has interpreted certain of the Bill
of Rights as a delineation of fundamental rights and has exalted
some rights over others, 4 ' there is disparagement of nonfunda-
mental rights in the first eight amendments43 and substantial
abridgement of some fundamental rights.'44 An obvious example
of spillover underlies the free press-fair trial controversy. The pref-
erential treatment accorded the first amendment right of free press
intrudes upon the accused's right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury.14
5
"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached
in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open
court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print."'48  The difference between theory and practice was
considered by the Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell.4 ' In
the Sheppard case, a great deluge of inflamatory publicity preceded
and accompanied the trial. The extrajudicial influences on the
jury were enormous. No change of venue was granted in Sheppard
and, although the jurors were admonished by the trial judge not
to read newspapers, watch television, or listen to the radio, they
were not sequestered. 48 The Court held that the probability of
prejudice was sufficient, in light of the "totality of the circum-
142 E.g., the first amendment freedom of the press subjugates sixth amendment
rights.
143 The second, third, and seventh amendments have not been deemed fundamental.
144 The eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment is an ex-
ample of a constitutional right that has not been accorded the expansive judicial devel-
opment for which it is suited. Although it is now apparently regarded as fundamental,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), it is not a procedural safeguard and
therefore cannot be easily applied in a definitive manner.
145 The first amendment rights have been called "preferred" by the Court. Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
146 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
147 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
14' Id. at 352-53.
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stances," to require reversal for a new trial.' The Court recog-
nized the need for reform to protect the accused's right to a fair
trial - "we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the
cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice
at its inception."' 0 Yet, the only preventative measures suggested
by the Court were aimed at keeping the press from news, and the
jury from the press.151  Once the news media picks up trial infor-
mation, no remedy is available to prevent dissemination of news
that is likely to prejudice the defendant if a juror reads it.' It
has been said that the right to a fair trial is the "most fundamental
of all freedoms, 1"" 'but even if this statement can be accepted lit-
erally, a free press is an indispensable requisite to a fair public
trial." The irony is dear: the accused cannot be assured of a fair
trial if the press is not present, and if the press is present, the pos-
sibility of prejudicial publicity looms. In order to fully appreciate
the fair trial-free press problem it is necessary to understand that a
fair trial is considerably more than a public trial. It is a speedy
trial 55 by impartial jurors 5 ' in which the defendant has the bene-
fit of counsel,' compulsory process, 5 ' confrontation of adverse
witnesses,"5 9 and knowledge of the charges against him..1 These
factors are meant to secure calm, solemn, and deliberative trials.
But freedom of the press may turn the trial into a "Roman holi-
day.'' 6  "The thrust of the press, moved by its imperatives for
newsworthiness, salability, speed and excitement, is posed against
the solemn, dispassionate, calculated rules of evidence and the punc-
tilious rules of court."' 2
149 Id.; accord, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
10 384 U.S. at 363.
151 For a proposed remedial statute, see 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1376, 1383 (1967).
152 384 U.S. at 358-63.
153 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
154 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
15 5 See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert,
198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLTJM. L
REV. 846 (1957).
'55 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (impartially selected).
157 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
158 U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
159 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally McKay, The Right of
Confrontation, 1959 WASIs. U.L.Q. 122.
160 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
161 State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 294, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 910 (1956).
162 A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITy 10 (1967).
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If a fair trial is the most fundamental of freedoms, the State
legislatures must provide more severe sanctions against irresponsible
elements in the news media. 6' The present methods of coping
with the problem are simply inadequate to ensure a fair measure
of justice, at least in the potentially sensational trial.'" A change
in venue is not apt to be effective in a sensational case,165 and it
could be expensive and inconvenient for the defendant. 6 A con-
tinuance involves delay that deprives the defendant of a speedy trial
in fact if not in theory.'67 This phenomenon is itself an example
of first amendment spillover that disparages another constitutional
right. Sequestration of the jury imposes a hardship on jurors to be
sure; yet cautionary instructions are inadequate measures to guar-
anty that the jurors will refrain from exposing themselves to extra-
judicial influences.' All of these problems attending current prac-
tices aimed at providing a fair trial would be solved, of course, if
the dissemination of prejudicial information were prohibited.
Should the State legislatures enact laws imposing strict penalites
for the release or solicitation of prejudicial matter, and if the Su-
preme Court proved to be tolerant of such laws, then there would
be some meaningful substance to the assertion that the fair trial is
the most fundamental freedom. But the competitive freedom of
the press will probably remain "preferred," and will continue to
attenuate the substance of that assertion.'69
163 See H. FELSHER & J. ROSEN, THE PRESS IN THE JURY Box 237-39 (1966);
18 W. RES. L. REv. 1376, 1383 (1967).
164 Although most newspaper publicity seems to take place at arrest (a time when
trial is probably at least 6 months away), it is probably the more sensational trials that
receive extended converage of the kind that prejudices the accused. See A. FRIENDLY
& R. GOLDFARB, supra note 162, at 61-62. See generally P. HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD
MURDER CASE (1961); McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need For
Reform, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1965) (Lee Harvey Oswald case discussion). Actually,
prejudicial publicity is quite rare. A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 162, at
71. It is an element of the sensational trial. Id.
165 A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 162, at 98.
166 Id. at 100.
167 Id.; see, e.g., Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 896 (1962) (necessary delay does not violate the right).
168 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
169 All of the proposed remedies for effectively curbing press releases in the inter-
ests of a fair trial suffer from the characteristic that "they would arbitrarily restrict the
flow of information about criminal cases and would enforce the restriction by criminal
penalties." J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS 261 (1966). The test for determin-
ing whether a contempt citation violates the freedom of the press was set down in
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The principle is "that the substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high (a 'clear and
present danger'] before utterances can be punished." Id. at 263. In light of the char-
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Another example of first amendment freedom of the press spill-
over carries beyond the trial. After a verdict of guilty is re-
turned by a jury, inflamatory newspaper publicity may pressure a
judge into imposing a harsher sentence than he otherwise would im-
pose.' If the jury verdict was "not guilty," but the verdict of the
press through pretrial and trial news reports and editorials was
"guilty," the newspaper verdict may be more acceptable to the gen-
eral public because the rationale supporting it is more widely
known. Consequently, despite vindication by processes of law, the
innocent defendant may suffer economic and social injuries as a
result of public opprobrium. Obviously, harm of this kind cannot
be cured by a reversal and a new trial. Notoriety once gained will
not easily subside.Y
In a different area of constitutional law, the Court has demon-
strated a concern for the long range effects of public notoriety. In
Spevack v. Klein, '7 the Court held that an attorney cannot be dis-
barred solely because he has invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination in an investigation of alleged misconduct. The Court
reasoned that the penalty for exercising the constitutional right was
too "costly." '  Significantly, the consequences thought to be too
"costly" in Spevack were loss of professional standing, reputation,
and livelihood." Whether the same considerations would provide
the basis for upholding a law prohibiting inflamatory news report-
ing cannot be determined until such a case arises. But this is cer-
tain: nothing short of prohibition can ensure an innocent person
that his right to be free from infamy, when found not guilty, will
be respected.'
acter of effective sanctions and the test for justifying an application of them, it is not
likely that the Court will be tolerant of laws so restricting freedom of the press.
'
7 0 See J. LolTON, supra note 169, at 170-71. The fact that the eighth amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not applied to the particular
facts of an individual lawsuit, but is only applied to laws, is significant here. See Rob-
inson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The punishment prescribed by a judge for a
particular defendant may be the product of public pressure and not of rational consid-
erations. Such a punishment could be excessive as applied to that particular defend-
ant, but not as a matter of law, since the law would authorize the punishment for the
given crime.
37 1 "Sam Sheppard" (finally found not guilty) has become a household word
and as any Clevelander will attest, the public issue of his guilt or innocence will never
be resolved. The fair trial-free press conflict, it seems, has been won by the press.
Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Criminal Proceedings, 66 CoLJM. L. REV.
34, 51 (1966).
172 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967).
17 Id.
174Id. at 516.
175 Waiver of the right to a jury trial does not cure the problem; the judge too is
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Many features of the present trial make an assurance of a rea-
sonably short trial duration impossible. The right to a speedy
trial is consequently a very limited one. In fact, the Supreme
Court has never held that there is a constitutional right to a speedy
trial; it has only held that there can be no unnecessary or oppres-
sive delay by the prosecution between -the time of arrest and the
commencement of trial.' Yet, short and expeditious criminal
trials would be desirable: they would reduce the period of time in
which the accused would be subjected to adverse, prejudicial news
coverage, diminish the period of trauma for the defendant, and
lower the costs of administration. To some extent trial speed
could be accelerated without jeopardizing the accused's right to a
fair trial.'
The privilege against self-incrimination plays a part in stunting
the growth of the right to speedy trial. The fact that the accused
does not have to testify in open court (or submit to a lie detector
test) necessitates an elaborate production of circumstantial evidence
in most cases. Hence, trials drag on unbearably178 while the prose-
cution connects the elements of its case in an effort to convince the
jury." 9 Because the contested criminal trial is usually protracted,
other criminal and civil contestants are forced to wait even longer
for their trials on an already prodigious docket."' The perpetually
human and susceptible to prejudicial publicity. J. LOFTON, supra note 169, at 170.
Further, the accused does not have an absolute right to waive a jury trial. Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
176 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pollard v. United States, 352
U.S. 354, 362 (1957) (delay must not be purposeful or oppressive); Beavers v. Hau-
bert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905); see Note, supra note 155. At the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, the right to a speedy trial was well established and included only
the period from arrest to trial; therefore, an historical analysis of the right discloses no
justification for extending the right to include the trial. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PRO-
CIEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 380-85 (1947).
177 The rules of criminal evidence could use some reform toward cutting down trial
time. See Miller, Beyond the Law of Evidence, 40 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1967).
178 C. DIcKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Collier ed. 1964).
179 Judge Warren Burger, noting that a typical trial in Denmark takes about 6
weeks, emphasizes that American trials often take from 3 to 6 years including several
trials and appeals. What to do About Crime in U.S., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 7, 1967, at 70, 72 (the problems - a complex procedure, the jury, the fifth
amendment). "When the American defendant is finally sentenced after this prolonged
process, he has been engaged in bitter warfare with society for years .... If he ... is
like most human beings, his battle with authority and in the courts develops a complex
of hostilities long before he goes to prison." (examples - Chessman in California,
Sheppard in Ohio).
18 0 See AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 110
(1965); B. BUCHHOLZ, H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959);
Zeisel, Delay by the Parties and Delay by the Courts, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 27 (1962).
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congested docket is alone the cause of another deplorable speedy
trial problem. The pressure of the expanding docket has influ-
enced courts in some jurisdictions to have a few judges hear "guilty
plea" cases en masse - a depersonalized procedure that minimizes
consideration for the individual defendants.'8s The anomaly is
dear: the exclusionary rule prevents an extension of the meaning
of the speedy trial right so as to regulate the duration of the trial
itself; the consequently elongated trial adds more weight to an
already burdened docket; the docket necessitates large summary
hearings in guilty plea cases - assembly line justice - with in-
deliberate speed. Obviously the fifth amendment privilege cannot
be blamed for all of this; the disparagement of a right to a speedy
trial goes much further. Many factors tend to lengthen trials: for
example, the impaneling of the jury, the presentation of motions
for change of venue, exclusion of evidence, calling and swearing of
witnesses, demonstrative evidentiary exhibits, long-winded lawyers,
meddling judges, arguments, summations, the judge's charge and
the jury's deliberation - all consume time. But the privilege is a
contributor. How does the affront to human dignity that results
from so much delay, concomitant newspaper, radio, and TV cover-
age, and personal defame measure up against the abrogation of the
right not to accuse oneself? Sam Sheppard wanted to take a lie
detector test administered by an impartial board." The State re-
fused while insisting that police administer the examination. Had
one side or the other had confidence enough to go forward with
the examination, or had Sam Sheppard been examined within a few
hours after the initial accusation and been found innocent, is it likely
that he would have suffered such widespread public disrepute? The
fact of arrest and opprobrious publicity seem to constitute greater
affronts to human dignity than would a guarded and procedurally
cured deprivation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The accused's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is also
impaired, to some extent, by the fifth amendment privilege. It is
all too dear that prejudice attends the defendant's failure to testify
on his own behalf. 8 ' A frequent reason for not taking the stand
18l AMERICAN AssEMBLY, supra note 180, at 111.
182 P. HOLMES, supra note 164, at 210.
183 In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 608 (1965), the Court prohibited comment
on the defendant's failure to take the stand. Although there is no intention here to
challenge the wisdom of that decision, it is noteworthy that no effort was made (or at
least nor mentioned) to discover whether most juries would be harder on the defendant
without comment than if there had been such comment.
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is the accused's recidivist status. Possibly a rule of constitutional
dimension, if there must be any rule of exclusion, would be better
served by disallowing proof of prior conviction and permitting the
accused to take the stand freely instead.
III. SCIENCE CHALLENGES CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. The Matter of the Mind
"A crime is any social harm defined and made punishable by
law."'84  It is usually composed of the concurrence of an evil intent
and conduct causally related to that intent."8 5 The concept of in-
tent, unlike conduct, is not observable, and courts therefore resort
to legal fictions to ascertain intent."' ° It is at least arguable that
criminal trials should be conducted only on the issue of conduct. 7
Whether the mens rea issue is considered or not, -the jury can be
expected to identify with the defendant and to inject the morals
of the community into the trial.'88 Even crime is not an absolute
concept.'8
9
The concept of punishment, unfortunately, encompasses both
the institution of "'how we deal with offenders"' and the particular
sanction that is exercised against the offender.' The connotation
of "punishment" emphasizes the sanction element and disparages
ideas of curative treatment for dealing with offenders. This is un-
fortunate because it has made the social responsibility for cure easy
to circumvent. 9' There is a significant distinction between the
labels "treatment" and "punishment": moral condemnation of the
community attaches to "punishment," but not to "treatment."'
92
"Treatment" envisions the possibility of removing the concept of
184 R. PmKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1957).
185 Id. at 725-26. Intent, of course, may be constructive; therefore the mens tea
element of a crime is more comprehensive than true intent. W. CLARK & W. MAR-
SHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 40 (4th ed. 1940). Intent must not be confused with mo-
tive. R. PERKINS, supra note 184, at 719.
186 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 185, § 40; E. SUTHERLAND, PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 13-14 (4th ed. 1947).
187 T. SzAsz, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 262 (1965).
188 Hall, Psychiatric Criminology: Is It a Valid Marriage? The Legal View, 16
BUFFALO L. REV. 349, 353 (1967).
189 See Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 989-90
(1940).
190 Swartz, Punishment and Treatment of Offenders, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 368,
373 (1967).
91Id. at 375-76.
192 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 405
(1958).
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punishment from the sanction.' Progress in this direction is com-
patible with the growing recognition of the low status of the con-
vict in society" 4 and the need for differentiating between volitional
crime and illness.'95
Insanity at the time of the crime prevents criminal responsi-
bility of the actor under present theories,'96 if the insanity can be
said 'to have caused the criminal act." 7 The difficulty with this
theory is that, in a sense, all criminals are mentally ill. "8 Another
difficulty lies in the fact that a psychiatrist who testifies cannot ex-
press his expert opinion as to what is wrong with the defendant and
what should be done to treat him, but must give an opinion as to
whether the defendant was criminally responsible for his act. This
requires the psychiatrist to make a moral evaluation as to whether
the defendant should be punished for his act.'99
The coming of the "therapeutic state' 20 0 has shifted the empha-
sis from the punishment of moral guilt to the treatment of the crim-
inal.2 1' Unfortunately, the treatment furnished to an individual
who is found not guilty by reason of insanity is often punishment
in the guise of therapy.0 2  Dr. Szasz points out that the defendant
committed to a hospital, which is all but in name a prison, is there
for an indeterminate period of time - that is, until cured. °20
Cure is unlikely if no treatment is provided and the indeter-
minate sentence makes it possible to be relatively unconcerned
about treatment. If the State were really concerned with providing
treatment for criminals, it could do so in prisons204 and this proce-
193 Graser, Psychiatric Criminology: Is It a Valid Marriage? Further Considera-
tions, 16 BUFFALO L REV. 364, 366 (1967).
194 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
195 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
IO9 C. JEFFERY, CImNAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL DISEASE 258 (1967).
197 Jeffery has argued that both mental illness and crime are behavior and that both
are dependent variables which are caused by some independent variable in the actor's
environment. He has contended that mental illness cannot therefore be causative of
criminal behavior. Id, at 226.
398Id, at 262; T. SZASz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 242 (1963). But see
Hall, supra note 188, at 353.
109P. RocHE, THE CRIMNAL MIND 249 (1958); T. SZASz, supra note 198, at
130, 136.
200 Kittrie, The Divestment of Criminal Justice and the Coming of the Therapeutic
State, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 43, 53 (1967).2 01 Id. at 61.
2 02 T. SzAsZ, supra note 198, at 114. The Supreme Court has recognized this
problem of punishment disguised as therapy in the juvenile court area. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
203 T. SZASZ, supra note 198, at 114.
2 04 Dr. Szasz argues that "even if we accept the argument that many criminals are
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dure would help make it possible to abolish involuntary mental
hospitalization and thereby improve the climate for treatment of
noncriminal mental patients.' 5
Optimally, the psychiatrist should be required to render his sci-
entific diagnosis and to explain how he reached that diagnosis
rather than to merely give an opinion on criminal responsibility
which is basically a moral judgment." 6 Because there is a lack of
standards for mental health, the psychiatrist's opinion is not verifi-
able and must be judged on the authority of the psychiatrist.0 7
The trial of criminal cases raising the issue of insanity should
be bifurcated.0 ' Everyone charged with a criminal offense should
be tried on the basic factual issue: Was he the actor?09 If he is
found to have been the actor, then society must take the steps neces-
sary to protect itself from whatever risks there are that he will com-
mit a similar offense in the future.210 The psychiatrist's expertise
could then be put to use at the disposition stage of the process and
the trial would not involve the traditional battle of the psychiatrists
on the issue of insanity.
This type of bifurcated trial has been subjected to constitutional
objections in several States.21' The theory is that since intent is
an element of nearly all crimes, the issue of sanity at the time of
the crime is crucial to the determination of guilt.212 The point is
mentally sick, it does not follow that they should be in mental hospitals rather than in
prisons. Mental hospitalization of offenders should not be, and cannot be, a substitute
for prison reform." Id. at 230.
205 Id. at 226-29.
206 Id. at 130, 136; P. ROCHE, supra note 199, at 272.
207 T. SZAsz, supra note 198, at 130.
208 See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
209 This is the view taken by numerous authorities, both in law and psychiatry.
See P. ROCHE, supra note 199, at 274 and authorities cited therein; T. SZAsz, supra
note 187, at 262. It seems in accord with the idea that due process requires the State
to prove the commission of some illegal act before incarcerating an offender even for
treatment Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
210 This probably means incarceration, but hopefully in an enlightened, reformed
prison where treatment directed particularly at criminals can be provided.
211 E.g., Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (due process clause of
State constitution held to prohibit elimination of insanity as defense to murder); State
v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) (State constitution held to prohibit with-
drawal of sanity issue from the jury but no constitutional objection to trial of insanity
plea separately from guilt issue); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910)
(right to trial by jury guaranteed by State constitution held to include trial on sanity
issue). A New York court has held that it was not bound by the finding of a psy-
chiatric commission which examined defendant before trial and concluded that his act
was produced by insanity at the time of the crime. The sanity issue was for the jury to
decide. People v. Whitman, 149 Misc. 159, 266 N.Y.S. 844 (Ct Gen. Sess. 1933).
212 H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 9 (1965); see note 211 supra.
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well taken but does not go to the heart of the bifurcated trial pro-
posal. It would seem that the defendant could not complain if he
were tried first by a jury (if he so elected), on the issue whether he
committed the alleged act, and then, if found to have been -the ac-
tor, were tried again before a jury on the issue of his sanity at the
time of the crime2 13
A more rational and scientific procedure would permit a jury
trial only on the issue whether the defendant committed the act.
The sanity issue would then be decided -by an impartial panel of ex-
perts, psychiatrists, and/or psychologists. The civil libertarian
might argue that the defendant would thus be deprived of a jury
trial on the issue of intent which is a critical element of the crime.
This view is subject to attack on two levels. First, the defendant
has had the benefit of trial by jury on the real issue which the
criminal trial is to determine - whether the defendant was the
actor. Once that issue is determined against him in the most reli-
able manner presently available, he should not be heard to com-
plain since the sanity issue and the disposition questions will then
be decided by the people with the most expertise in that area. Sec-
ond, the problem of intent is an extremely complex and difficult
one, and to include such a confusing issue in a trial designed to
protect the accused can only muddy the waters. 14
The reason for such a procedure is that a modern trial, in order
to reflect present-day concern for human dignity, must employ the
most reliable means available to make these crucial decisions. The
psychiatric panel must be impartial and not just State oriented. It
would therefore be wise not to permit panel members to serve for
long terms and there must be high qualifications and ethical stand-
ards set for panelists. There must be provision for judicial review
of their decisions which would then be given the weight now given
to other administrative determinations when cases are appealed to
213 This could be done by permitting the same jury to hear both issues but at sepa-
rate times, or by using two different juries. Using the same jury would be the less de-
sirable alternative because it would involve some of the confusion of issues which the
plan is intended to avoid. Using two different juries would be more expensive and
more vulnerable to constitutional objections. Either plan might raise problems as to
what kind of instructions could be given to the second jury and thus might raise prob-
lems analogous to those discussed in connection with Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra; 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 382
(1968).
214 According to Dr. Roche: "A person commits an unlawful act and somehow he
does so because he is willful, malicious and so forth. It should be dear that these ab-
stractions explain nothing, have no independent existence and their usefulness is lim-
ited as a kind of paraphernalia in the rituals of guilt fastening." P. RocHE, supra
note 199, at 12.
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the courts. The practice of hospitalizing an offender found to be
mentally ill for an indeterminate period should be carefully exam-
ined. Perhaps this risk could be reduced by providing that neither
punishment nor treatment can continue for more than a definite
period of years - with length of commitment varying with the
type of offense. At the end of that period, the person would be
released unless the State could carry a heavy burden of proof and
prove to a judge or a jury that the person represents a serious dan-
ger to society if released. The habeas corpus remedy would re-
main available for a person who is ready for return to society be-
fore the mandatory period ends or for the person who is not receiv-
ing the treatment which might prepare him for such a return, but
such an incarcerated person would have the burden in either case.
The new system, if implemented, would present serious prob-
lems, but the law must not neglect them if the process is to balance
the protection of society with individual rights and the elevation of
human dignity.
B. Narcoanalysis
Brief mention should be made of the so-called "truth serums."
Drugs such as scopalamine have been used for several years by po-
lice215 and by psychiatrists 1' to facilitate interviewing and interro-
gation of subjects. The procedure begins with the injection of a
drug and interrogation begins when the subject is generally dis-
oriented, fumbles around for objects, and has mild hallucinations. 1 '
Although the drugs are supposed to bring out the truth,218 assist the
memory of amnesia victims,21 and loosen up a suspect who is with-
holding evidence,22 ° their true value is dubious.' There is consid-
erable risk that the subject will admit acts which he did not com-
mit"' and it is certainly possible for the subject to lie or withhold
information.223
In addition to their questionable scientific standing, these drugs
2 15 See J. ROLIN, POLICE DRUGS (1956).
2 16 Saher, Appendix to id.
217 Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
513, 516 (1951).
218 Id. at 517.
219 Macdonald, Truth Serum, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 259, 262 (1955).
220 Muehlberger, supra note 217, at 519.
221 Id. at 524; Saher, supra note 216, at 182.
222 Saher, supra note 216, at 176.
223 Macdonald, supra note 219, at 263.
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present a very serious danger to individual liberties. The Supreme
Court has strictly circumscribed police interrogation in recent deci-
sions, and in light of Townsend v. Sain,2 5 seems unreceptive to
experimentation with narcoanalysis in the administration of criminal
justice.
Because of the limited value of these drugs and the great dan-
gers they raise, the present reluctance to permit their use seems
quite proper.2 6 The courts and legislators should not completely
close -their minds to narcoanalysis, however, because the procedure
may be valuable in certain limited circumstances where the risks of
abuse can be controlled, and because the techniques and the drugs
may be improved to the point where reliability becomes high.
C. Polygraphy
The eminent trial attorney F. Lee Bailey has stated: "Professor
Wigmore wrote, in 1923, ,that if science ever devises a physiologi-
cal test of credibility, the law will run to meet it. That same year
the Court of Appeals for -the District of Columbia was confronted
with such a test, and ran in the opposite direction." 227  Mr. Bailey
was referring to the case in which "lie detector" evidence was first
rejected as evidence in a criminal trial.2 ' The results of polygraph
examinations are still inadmissible "apart from an agreement and
stipulation between the opposing parties to have an examination
conducted and to permit the results to be considered in court.... "22
Obviously, there is still doubt that the polygraph is a reliable
means of determining whether the subject was lying. Professors
Reid and Inbau, who are probably the world's leading polygraph
experts, report that on the basis of their experience, the polygraph is
very reliable when administered by an expert examiner.!" Their
224 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
25 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Court was concerned because it thought that any
statements made while under the influence of such drugs could not be products of a
"free intellect." Id. at 307-08.
226 There has been great reluctance to accept the results of the tests in evidence.
Polen, The Admissibility of Truth Serum Tests io the Courts, 35 TBMP. L.Q. 401, 410
(1962).
227 Bailey, Book Review, 1 SUFFOLK U.L .REv. 137 (1967).
228F rye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
229 J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DEcEPTION 237 (1966). Reid and Inbau
have argued for admissibility if the test is given by a qualified examiner. Id. at 257.
230 Id. at 234.
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experience has been gained primarily in assisting the police with
interrogations and their assertions are thus subject to question.2 3'
The polygraph could and should be utilized as a means of pro-
tecting the innocent from the opprobrium incident to arrest and
criminal prosecution. It would be especially useful in cases likely
to be attended by great publicity, but could also be a valuable pro-
tection of individual liberty in more mundane cases.
F. Lee Bailey argues that an accused should have the right to a
polygraph examination conducted by impartial experts. He would
permit the results of such an examination to be used only in favor
of the accused.232 This proposal seems consistent with the idea that
our system is willing to permit some guilty persons to go free in
order to protect the innocent. Such a plan would make it possible
to protect the innocent accused from adverse publicity and prosecu-
tion23 which are often more serious risks than the risk of convic-
tion.23 4 The experts would not be police technicians but highly
qualified and impartial experts. Such experts are probably diffi-
cult to find today but, if the need for this system is publicly ac-
knowledged, they could be trained.23
If such an examination exonerated the accused, he could be re-
leased quickly and the police could return to a warm trail. Under
present procedures, the police investigations concentrate on seeking
evidence to support a conviction of the suspect and, by the time he
is acquitted, it is too late to effectively resume the investigation.
If the reliability of the polygraph technique develops to a very
high level, society should consider requiring every accused to sub-
mit to an examination by impartial examiners. This type of pro-
cedure would raise constitutional objections based on the privilege
against self-incrimination, but it may be the only way to get the
maximum benefit from the system because of the reluctance of de-
fense counsel to have their clients submit to such a test. The sub-
sequent trial of persons for whom the test results indicate guilt or
231 Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detec-
tion, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 714 (1961).
232 Bailey, supra note 227, at 141.
233 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
234 It will be necessary to allow time for investigation before the test because the
examiner must know the facts of the crime in order to effectively formulate the ques-
tions. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 229, at 10.
235 For a brief discussion of the necessary qualifications and training, see id. at 235.
Police-oriented examiners are likely to be quite interested in obtaining confessions from
their subjects. Reid and Inbau suggest how this can be done. Id. at 236-67. This is
one reason why examiners must not be police biased. Most of today's examiners were
police trained. Bailey, supra note 227, at 139.
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are inconclusive would involve problems similar to the Griffin
situation. "  The results would not be used as evidence against the
accused, but jurors might eventually learn that all criminal de-
fendants who go to trial have failed to pass a polygraph test. The
question would then be how best to counteract their natural infer-
ences. Counsel would again have to decide whether to have the
judge instruct the jury that the test results were not to be considered
by them or to allow nothing at all to be said. Hopefully, the jury
will prove reliable enough so that the first course will be accept-
able.
The polygraph could then become a device which serves to ele-
vate human dignity and assists the police in eliminating innocent
suspects.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present criminal trial process leaves much to be desired.
The reliability of the factfinding process is difficult to measure,
238
and recent attempts to do so have not received the cooperation they
deserve .1 9  The recent wave of constitutional decisions aimed at
protecting the rights of the accused has had serious diseconomic
consequences. New approaches are necessary if the -trial is to com-
bine the goals of truth determination and protection of the accused.
Finally, scientific techniques such as psychiatry and polygraphy are
not being optimally employed.
Hopefully, there will be a determined interdisciplinary effort
to understand the present functioning of the criminal trial process.
An immediate and extensive review of the process is necessary if
law and science are to unite, as they must, to ensure justice and to
elevate human dignity.
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236 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
237 Id.
238 Professor Ovid Lewis discusses the problems involved. See Lewis, The High
Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L REV. 528 (1968). Professor Kaplan
has written a very important book on methodology which is -must" reading for research-
ers in this area. A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY (1964).
2 39 See notes 27, 55 supra.
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